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Abstract Envy is a frustrating emotion that arises from
upward social comparison. Two studies investigated the
appraisals that distinguish benign envy (aimed at improv-
ing one’s own situation) from malicious envy (aimed at
pulling down the superior other). Study 1 found that
appraisals of deservingness and control potential differen-
tiated both types of envy. We manipulated these appraisals
in Study 2 and found that while both did not inﬂuence the
intensity of envy, they did determine the type of envy that
resulted. The more a situation was appraised as unde-
served, the more participants experienced malicious envy.
Benign envy was experienced more when the situation was
not undeserved, and the most when the situation was
appraised as both deserved and controllable. The current
research also clariﬁes how the types of envy differ from the
related emotions admiration and resentment.
Keywords Envy   Appraisals   Deservingness   Control
potential   Social comparisons   Admiration   Resentment
Introduction
Envy is a powerful emotion that ‘‘arises when a per-
son lacks another’s superior quality, achievement, or
possession and either desires it or wishes that the other
lacked it’’ (Parrott and Smith 1993, p. 906). Scholars have
argued that only a malicious form of envy aimed at dero-
gating the envied person should be considered ‘‘envy
proper’’ (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007; Schoeck 1969;
Smith 2004; Smith and Kim 2007). Parrott (1991), how-
ever, made a case to also consider the existence of a non-
malicious form of envy. Such a distinction between mali-
cious and benign envy could help to explain why envy
activates both a desire to hurt the envied other and to a
motivation to do better (Cohen-Charash 2009; Schaubroeck
and Lam 2004).
Recent research indeed conﬁrms that there are two types
of envy: benign envy, a non-malicious form aimed at
improving one’s own situation, and malicious envy aimed
at pulling down the envied person. Across several cultures,
these two envy types have distinct experiential contents
(Van de Ven et al. 2009). That is, they differ in the feel-
ings, thoughts, action tendencies, and motivational goals
that comprise the emotional experience. Benign and mali-
cious envy thus differ on all phenomenological aspects.
Moreover, these distinct envy types have idiosyncratic
behavioral implications, underscoring the relevance of this
distinction (Van de Ven et al. 2010, 2011a, b). However,
little is known about the speciﬁc appraisal processes that
determine when people will feel benign or malicious envy
and subsequently become motivated to behave construc-
tively or destructively.
The current goal is thus to reveal the appraisal patterns
of benign and malicious envy and in particular those
appraisals that shed light on the differences of these highly
related emotions. We chose to examine these appraisals in
the context of related social comparison emotions: admi-
ration and resentment. This not only provides insight into
when each emotion is likely to occur, but also helps to
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vate different goals and action tendencies (Frijda 1986;
Zeelenberg et al. 2008). Because benign and malicious
envy have such different consequences (increasing moti-
vation to do better versus hostile behavior aimed at pulling
down the superior person) ﬁnding what elicits them seems
indeed very important. We now ﬁrst discuss the literature
regarding appraisals, before we go into the predictions we
make regarding the appraisals for benign envy, malicious
envy, admiration, and resentment.
Appraisal theory
Appraisal theory is one of the most inﬂuential approaches
to emotion (see for a review, Scherer et al. 2001). The core
idea in appraisal theory is that each emotion can be related
to a speciﬁc pattern of appraisals, which are cognitions
about the perceived antecedents of emotional experiences.
Here we adopt the approach of Roseman et al. (1996) that
is derived from several different appraisal theories (Frijda
1986; Lazarus 1991; Roseman 1984; Scherer 1984; Smith
and Ellsworth 1985; Weiner 1985). Roseman et al. differ-
entiate the following appraisal dimensions: unexpected-
ness, motivational state, control potential, legitimacy,
problem source, and agency (is the situation caused by the
person him- or herself, by another person, or by the cir-
cumstances?). Table 1 displays the exact appraisals used in
Study 1. These dimensions have been shown to reliably
differentiate even highly related emotions, such as regret
and disappointment (Van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2002). We
did not expect all of these appraisals to differ for benign
and malicious envy, but to be complete in our exploratory
analysis in Study 1 we included them all. Later in this
introduction we will only discuss the appraisals for which
we had speciﬁc hypotheses.
We added one additional appraisal dimension that
seemed appropriate in this context: deservingness. De-
servingness refers to whether the outcome for oneself or
another is contingent on the situation: if there is a ﬁt
between the situation and the outcome it is deserved, else it
is undeserved (Feather 1999). A student who studied hard
and gets a good grade is perceived to deserve it (as the
situation of studying hard is consistent with getting a good
grade), while a situation in which a student who cheated
gets a good grade is perceived to be undeserved. Prior envy
research regularly found that subjective unfairness is rela-
ted to envy (Smith 1991; Smith et al. 1994), but that
research did not differentiate benign from malicious envy.
We will detail why we added this dimension in the next
section, where we explain our hypotheses.
The appraisal patterns of benign and malicious envy
The envy literature already allows for several predictions
concerning the speciﬁc appraisal dimensions for malicious
and benign envy. Envy is found to arise when people are
Table 1 Appraisal dimensions measured in study 1
Dimension Item and scale anchors
Unexpectedness The event was expected (1) to The event was unexpected (9)
Situational state I believed that the event improved things (1) to I believed that the event made things worse (9)*
Motivational
state
I wanted to get or keep something pleasurable (1) to I wanted to get rid of or avoid something painful (9)*
Probability I was certain about the consequences of the event (1) to I was uncertain about the consequences of the event (9)*
Control
potential
I thought that there was something I could do about the event (1) to I thought that there was nothing I could do about the event
(9)*
Legitimacy I thought of myself as morally right (1) or I thought of myself as morally wrong (9)*
Own power I felt that I was powerless (1) to I felt that I was powerful (9)*
Problem source I thought that the event did not reveal the basic nature of someone or something (1) to I thought that the event did reveal the
basic nature of someone or something (9)
Agency
Self I thought that the event was not at all caused by me (1) to I thought that the event was very much caused by me (9)
Other I thought that the event was not at all caused by someone else (1) to I thought that the event was very much caused by
someone else (9)
Circumstances I thought that the event was not at all caused by circumstances beyond anyone’s control (1) to I thought that the event was
very much caused by circumstances beyond anyone’s control (9)
Deservingness I thought that the event was very undeserved (1) to I thought that the event was very deserved (9)
An asterisk* indicates that responses were reverse-coded before analysis. This table is adapted from Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002). The
anchors described above always followed the stem: ‘‘My emotion was caused, because ___’’., with the speciﬁc emotion of that inserted instead of
the word emotion
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123confronted with a superior other, in a domain that is
important to their self-view, and if the other was initially
similar to them (Salovey and Rodin 1984). Smith and
colleagues (Smith 2000; Smith et al. 1994) clariﬁed that
someone should also perceive to have low control over the
situation (making it difﬁcult to change the situation), and
feel that it is unfair that the other has the superior position.
Where these studies did not differentiate benign and
malicious envy, Van de Ven et al. (2009) content analyzed
written personal experiences of malicious envy, benign
envy, admiration, and resentment. That analysis conﬁrmed
that both benign and malicious envy contained explicit
social comparisons (‘‘she got a good grade while I did
not’’), whereas these were hardly ever present for episodes
of admiration and resentment. Furthermore, for both envy
types the social comparison other was likely to be similar
to them and the domain in which the emotional event took
place was likely to be important. Interestingly, the two
dimensions Smith and colleagues theorized to be the main
causes of envy, low control potential and perceived
unfairness, appeared to be mainly present in stories about
malicious envy, not in those of benign envy.
Although these results provide some direction as to
where to expect differences in appraisals associated with
benign and malicious envy, there are two reasons why such
content coding of events is not sufﬁcient to draw conclu-
sions regarding the appraisals (Roseman et al. 1996). First,
having external raters code the content of an episode is
clearly not the same as asking individuals themselves what
caused the emotion (Frijda 1993; Parkinson and Manstead
1992; Roseman et al. 1990). Second, recalled episodes
might contain multiple emotions, and the coding may pick
up all of these. As Roseman et al. (1996, p. 245) stated:
‘‘Unless the subject is instructed to specify the appraisals
that are relevant to the primary emotion under investiga-
tion, appraisals relevant to other emotions may be reported,
obscuring true appraisal-emotion relationships.’’
Given the different behaviors that benign and malicious
envy are associated with, it is important to understand
when each type of envy is elicited. As we explain below,
we have reason to believe that benign and malicious envy
will predominantly differ with respect to the perceived
deservingness of the situation and whether people think
they can do something about it (control potential).
How deservingness determines which type of envy is
elicited
We expected that envy-eliciting situations in which another
is undeservedly better off will elicit malicious envy, while
situations in which another is deservedly better off are
more likely to elicit benign envy. It is important to note that
deservingness differs from entitlement, with the latter
referring to lawful or contractual outcomes and the former
to earned outcomes (Feather 2003). For example, a col-
league might not deserve a promotion, but might be enti-
tled to it based on the number of years he works for the
company. The deservingness of the situation provides
information as to which emotion will be elicited and thus
seems important to add as one of the important appraisal
dimensions (Feather 2006; Feather and McKee 2009). For
example, a deserved positive outcome can lead to feelings
of pride, while a similar but undeserved outcome can lead
to feelings of guilt.
The potential relation between deservingness and envy
has been proposed before, with several authors claiming
that undeservingness is a key component of envy (Ben-
Ze’ev 1992; Ortony et al. 1988). Consistent with this are
ﬁndings that subjective injustice is indeed related to typical
envy experiences, such as depressive and hostile feelings
(Smith et al. 1994). Envious people also became less
cooperative towards someone who was undeservedly better
off, but not when the advantage of the other was deserved
(Parks et al. 2002). A clear link thus seems to exist between
perceptions of undeservingness and the hostile component
of envy. We therefore reason that upward comparisons
with people who do not deserve the advantage will elicit
malicious envy, while comparisons with those who deserve
the advantage will elicit benign envy.
This is important to test, as these predictions are at odds
with the (untested) predictions of others. Ben-Ze’ev (1990)
reasoned that if an advantage of another person is per-
ceived to be deserved, the resulting (undifferentiated) envy
will be less intense, as there is less reason to feel frustrated
because the other is just better. In contrast to this, Miceli
and Castelfranchi (2007) theorize that the more deserved it
is perceived to be that the other has something one lacks,
the more intense the envy will be. After all, an envious
person who is outperformed by someone who really is
much better might feel especially frustrated. We, however,
predict that the intensity of the emotional experience of
envy will not be affected by the perceived deservingness of
the situation, but that appraisals of deservingness determine
whether malicious or benign envy is felt.
How control potential determines which type of envy
is elicited
Control potential refers to the perceived ability to control
or do something about the event. As early as 1597, Bacon
already reasoned that envy would be strongest for those
who feel they cannot improve their situation. Similarly,
Rawls (1971) argued that envy would become hostile when
people have no opportunity to act constructively. Others go
even further and argue that low perceived control is a
necessary condition for envy to occur (Ortony et al. 1988;
Motiv Emot (2012) 36:195–204 197
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their theorizing to what they referred to as ‘‘envy proper,’’
which corresponds to malicious envy and explicitly not to
benign envy. We predicted that appraisals of low control
potential would elicit malicious envy, while appraisals of
high control potential would elicit benign envy.
Discriminant validity: distinguishing envy
from adjacent emotions
Until now we have been emphasizing the differences in the
appraisal patterns of benign and malicious envy. In what
follows, we compare them with the closely related but
different emotions admiration and resentment. In order to
paint a complete portrait of the appraisal patterns of
malicious and benign envy, we consider it important to
investigate how these emotions differ from their close
relatives. One could argue that benign envy resembles
admiration, and that malicious envy resembles resentment.
If we were to ﬁnd clear differences between these emo-
tions, it would be testimony to both the importance of
studying envy and distinguishing benign from malicious
envy.
Admiration
Admiration has been deﬁned as the emotional response to
non-moral excellence (Algoe and Haidt 2009). Although
both benign envy and admiration are felt when people are
confronted with a superior other, there is a strong indica-
tion that they are different experiences (Van de Ven et al.
2009). First, benign envy feels frustrating, while admira-
tion is a pleasant feeling. Second, benign envy was found
to lead to action tendencies aimed at improving one’s own
situation, while admiration was not. Still, some have
argued that perhaps the benign type of envy is more akin to
admiration than to what they consider ‘‘envy proper’’,
namely malicious envy (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007;
Rawls 1971; Smith and Kim 2007). As such it is important
to investigate what appraisals differ between envy and
these related emotions.
The appraisal that we expected to differ most between
benign envy and admiration is that of self-agency. We
expected the self to be less involved for admiration than for
benign envy. This would be consistent with our earlier
content analysis (Van de Ven et al. 2009). In it, we found
that benign envy, but not admiration, was related to explicit
social comparisons (e.g., ‘‘I did not pass the exam, while
the other person did’’). It could also explain why admira-
tion is a more pleasant emotion and benign envy is a
frustrating one: if the upward comparison reﬂects badly on
oneself frustration is more likely to occur. Because of this,
we also expected the situation to have worsened somewhat
for benign envy but not for admiration (predicting a dif-
ference for benign envy and admiration on the situational
state appraisal). Finally, if the self is not involved for
admiration, we expected that perceptions of having control
over the situation would not be as important for admiration
as they are for benign envy.
Resentment
Merriam Webster’s dictionary deﬁnes resentment as the
indignant displeasure or persistent ill will at something
regarded as wrong. According to this deﬁnition, resentment
is broader than envy and admiration, for which there must
always be a superior other. Resentment can also be directed
at institutions or at persons perceived to be in an inferior
position. For example, people who feel that their situation
is superior to that of people in a communist system, might
still resent communists if they perceive the communist
belief system to be morally wrong. In the current research,
we asked participants to recall experiencing resentment for
one speciﬁc person, as that is the resentment that is rela-
tively close to malicious envy.
We expected that both malicious envy and resentment
would be elicited in undeserved situations, but that they
primarily differ with respect to appraisals of agency. Others
have theorized that resentment is more likely if the situa-
tion is perceived to be objectively unfair (D’Arms 2009;
Rawls 1971), while (malicious) envy is more likely if there
is more of a subjective feeling of undeservingness (Feather
and Sherman 2002; Smith et al. 1994). However, appraisal
theory suggests that appraisals that lead to certain emotions
are by deﬁnition subjective perceptions of the situation
(Scherer et al. 2001). Furthermore, perceptions of fairness
and deservingness are likely to be strongly related, making
these unlikely candidates for differentiating envy from
resentment.
Ben-Ze’ev (2002) argued that a core difference between
envy and resentment is that the latter is caused by a per-
ceived moral transgression, while the former is not. This
implies that resentment would be elicited in situations in
which the other is blamed for the immoral behavior that
brought him or her in undeserved superior position, while
for malicious envy this would not be the case. Thus, if the
other person actually caused you to be worse off resent-
ment is more likely, while malicious envy is more likely if
situational factors are responsible. For example, a football
player could be maliciously envious of another player who
undeservedly made the ﬁrst team if it was the decision of
the coach to choose the other, but the football player would
resent the other player if the other player had cheated with
his playing record to get into the ﬁrst team. We predicted
that resentment exists if the other caused the event (the
dimension of agency that measures whether the situation
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something about the nature of this other person, while
malicious envy would exist if it were more the circum-
stances that had caused the event.
Taken together, we were interested in the appraisal pat-
terns of benign and malicious envy and we studied them in
the context of the related emotions admiration and resent-
ment. In Study 1 we sampled personal experiences of
benign envy, malicious envy, admiration, and resentment,
and compared the appraisals that caused these emotional
experiences. In Study 2 we examined whether manipula-
tions of deservingness and control potential would differ-
entially inﬂuence benign or malicious envy in participants.
These studies help to show how benign and malicious envy
differ from each other and from related emotions. Further-
more, they help to predict when people will become moti-
vated to do better for themselves when confronted with a
superior other person (when benign envy is elicited) and
when people will become motivated to engage in hostile,
destructive behavior (when malicious envy is elicited).
Study 1
Method
One hundred and thirty-six participants (112 females,
Mage = 20 years) were randomly distributed to either the
Benign Envy, Malicious Envy, Admiration, or the
Resentment condition, with 34 participants per condition.
One participant from the resentment condition was exclu-
ded from the analyses, as she indicated to have never
experienced it.
Participants arrived in the lab for a series of studies, of
which ours was part. Depending on the condition, they
recalled one of four personal experiences: benign envy,
malicious envy, admiration, or resentment. Participants
wrote brieﬂy about how that experience had felt to them.
After doing so, the participants were asked a series of
questions designed to measure appraisals (see Table 1). We
included the nine different appraisal dimensions adopted
from Roseman et al. (1996) that were successfully used by
Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002). We additionally included
the appraisal item for deservingness (Feather and McKee
2009). Each appraisal item asked whether a particular
appraisal had caused the participant to feel the emotion that
was recalled. For example, an item assessing the extent to
which an appraisal of deservingness had caused a partici-
pant to feel admiration was, ‘‘My admiration was caused
because I thought that the event was very undeserved (1)
… I thought that the event was very deserved (9)’’. A
detailed account of this procedure is provided by Roseman
et al. (1996).
Participants rated the extent to which each appraisal had
caused their emotion. Roseman et al. (1996) point out that
it is important to speciﬁcally ask for the causes of the
emotion under study for two reasons. First, rating the sit-
uation could lead to different responses than rating the
causes of the emotion does (Frijda 1993; Parkinson and
Manstead 1992; Roseman et al. 1990). Second, some
recalled situations might actually contain several emotions,
making it important to test the direct cause of the speciﬁc
emotion under study.
Results and discussion
Table 2 shows the mean scores on each appraisal scale per
emotion condition. These were entered into a MANOVA,
using the recalled emotion as a between-subjects factor.
Overall, a clear difference existed on the appraisals between
the emotion conditions, F(36, 356) = 5.07, p\.001,
gp
2 = .33. We will ﬁrst discuss the differences between
benign and malicious envy, and then compare benign envy
to admiration and malicious envy to resentment.
Benign versus malicious envy
Two differences existed for benign and malicious envy in
the appraisals that elicited these emotions. First, and as
expected, the perceived deservingness of the situation
clearly mattered: For malicious envy, the situation was
strongly perceived to be undeserved, while for benign envy
this was not the case. Deservingness was thus clearly related
to the type of envy elicited. Second, we also found a dif-
ference with respect to the appraisal of control potential.
Those in the benign envy condition indicated that they had
more control over the situation than those in the malicious
envy condition. These two ﬁndings conﬁrm our predictions.
Benign envy versus admiration
We predicted that for benign envy, but not for admiration,
the recalled situation had reﬂected badly upon the partici-
pant. Consistent with this, participants indeed felt that they
had caused the situation much less for admiration than for
benign envy. They also indicated lower control potential
with admiration than with benign envy, another indication
that they were more involved for benign envy than for
admiration. Also, they felt that the event worsened more
for benign envy, and thus that the situation eliciting benign
envy reﬂected badly upon them. Two other ﬁndings were
that participants felt that the event had revealed more about
the other for admiration than for benign envy, and that the
event was even more strongly deserved for admiration than
for benign envy. Both reﬂect the idea that for admiration it
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how this reﬂects on the person experiencing the emotion.
Malicious envy versus resentment
Resentment was elicited more in unfair situations attributed
to the willful behavior of the other, while malicious envy
was thought to exist more if there was a subjective expe-
rience of undeservingness caused by the circumstances.
Consistent with this, we found that resentment existed if
the events were attributed more to the behavior of the other
person than for the events that elicited malicious envy. In
turn, the events that elicited malicious envy were attributed
more to the circumstances than the events that elicited
resentment were. Furthermore, the events that caused
resentment also truly revealed something about the other
person more than those that elicited malicious envy. This
all suggests that resentment exists more if the other is to
blame whereas malicious envy exists more if the situational
circumstances are to blame. Finally, we also found that
events that elicited resentment had worsened the situation
for the participant even more than the events causing
malicious envy.
Study 1 thus suggests that admiration is more likely if
being outperformed does not reﬂect badly on oneself. If it
does reﬂect badly upon oneself, but the situation is
deserved, benign envy is likely to result. If it is undeserved,
however, which emotion is elicited depends on who is to
blame. If the person who is better off is to blame, resent-
ment will occur, while if the circumstances are more to
blame malicious envy is likely to be elicited. In Study 2 we
examined the appraisals that lead to benign and malicious
in a controlled setting.
Study 2
Study 2 manipulates the appraisals of deservingness and
coping potential and tests whether this inﬂuences the
elicitation of benign and malicious envy. We built upon the
ﬁndings of Study 1 to make sure that admiration and
resentment are not likely to be elicited. A key difference
between malicious envy and resentment is whether the
other is blamed for the situation (which leads to resent-
ment) or whether the circumstances are blamed (leading to
malicious envy). We therefore created situations in which
the other was not objectively to blame for the situation.
Second, in order not to elicit admiration, we created situ-
ations in which the upward comparison reﬂects (somewhat)
negatively on the participant.
Method
One hundred and twenty-four participants (75 females,
Mage = 20 years) were randomly assigned to one of the
conditions of a 2 (Deservingness: Undeserved vs.
Deserved) 9 2 (Control Potential: Low vs. High) design
(with n = 30–32 per condition). Participants read a sce-
nario in which a coworker received a raise while the par-
ticipant did not. This raise was either undeserved (because
Table 2 Appraisal dimensions of admiration, benign envy, malicious envy, and resentment in study 1
Admiration Benign envy Malicious
envy
Resentment Statistics
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F(3,132) p gp
2
Unexpectedness (expected—unexpected) 6.09 (1.91) 6.03 (1.99) 5.97 (2.26) 6.42 (1.89) .34 .799 .01
Situational state (worsened—improved) 6.44
a (1.78) 4.44
b (1.81) 4.35
b (1.86) 3.42
c (1.80) 16.54 .001 .28
Motivational state (avoid—approach) 6.82
a (1.34) 6.18
ab (2.28) 6.44
ab (2.11) 5.61
b (2.45) 2.02 .115 .04
Probability (uncertain—certain) 5.12 (1.77) 4.85 (2.09) 5.06 (2.20) 4.82 (2.05) .18 .910 .00
Control potential (no control—control) 4.03
b (1.62) 5.06
a (2.32) 4.06
b (1.77) 3.91
b (2.23) 2.40 .071 .05
Legitimacy (morally wrong—right) 5.56
b (1.38) 5.91
ab (1.71) 6.59
a (1.93) 7.55
a (1.60) 9.21 .001 .17
Own power (powerful—powerless) 6.09
b (1.53) 6.76
ab (1.52) 6.94
a (1.56) 7.09
a (1.94) 2.45 .066 .05
Problem source (did not reveal true nature—did
reveal)
6.59
a (1.46) 5.44
b (2.27) 5.43
b (2.22) 6.12
a (1.67) 10.83 .001 .20
Agency
Self (not by self—by self) 3.18
a (1.88) 4.21
b (1.86) 3.65
ab (1.89) 3.21
a (1.92) 2.20 .091 .05
Other (not by other—by other) 5.82
a (2.24) 5.62
a (1.91) 5.88
a (2.19) 7.09
b (1.67) 3.66 .014 .08
Circumstances(not circumstances—circumstances) 4.47
b (2.43) 4.79
b (2.25) 5.00
b (2.22) 3.09
a (2.16) 4.80 .003 .10
Deservingness (undeserved—deserved) 6.74
c (2.47) 4.56
b (2.36) 2.50
a (1.66) 2.52
a (1.77) 31.34 .001 .42
Means with different superscripts differ at p\.05, tested with LSD post hoc tests
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(because the coworker reels in more clients). Control
Potential was manipulated by providing information that
the next evaluation for a possible raise is in a year (Low
Control) or that the next possibility was already in
3 months (High Control). An example of the scenario (the
Low Control and Undeserved condition) is:
You and some fellow students are working in a call
center to earn some extra money. The call center is
part of a big ofﬁce supplier and targets large com-
panies. It is your job to contact existing clients for
new orders, and to reel in some new clients.
As performance is importance for management,
everyone is evaluated on a yearly basis, and your
wage for the upcoming year is determined based on
this evaluation. Last week the evaluations took place
and your new wage is set.
There is one thing that frustrates you: One of your
coworkers, whom you often hang out with and
get along with reasonably well, ends up receiving a
higher wage than you, despite the fact that the eval-
uation actually shows that your coworker reels in less
clients and also sells less.
Next, the participants responded to a number of ques-
tions. As manipulation checks we asked participants whe-
ther they had felt that the situation was deserved (-3
undeserved; ?3 deserved), and whether they would have
felt control over the situation (-3 deﬁnitely not; ?3 deﬁ-
nitely so). The overall intensity of the envy was assessed by
‘‘how jealous would you be towards your coworker’’
(0 = not at all, 8 = very much so; these scale anchors
were also used for the other questions), which we did not
predict to differ across the conditions. We asked for jeal-
ousy instead of envy, because this term is most often used
in colloquial language (Smith et al. 1988), and because the
Dutch language does not have one single word for both
types of envy as for example the English language does.
Benign and malicious envy were measured with two
questions each, based on differences in their experiential
content (Van de Ven et al. 2009). Benign envy was
assessed by asking whether they ‘‘would be inspired’’ and
‘‘would start to work harder,’’ r(124) = .46, p\.001.
Malicious envy was assessed by asking whether they
‘‘would secretly wish that their coworker would lose cli-
ents’’ and ‘‘would gossip about the coworker to others’’,
r(124) = .40, p\.001.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
The results are shown in Table 3. As predicted, the ratings
of the jealousy felt towards the coworker were similar
across conditions, all F’s\1, M = 4.31, SD = 2.14,
indicating that the manipulations did not inﬂuence the
intensity of the experienced envy which is what we
expected (as we did not expect differences in the intensity
of the envy elicited, but only of the type of envy that would
be elicited).
The manipulations worked as intended. The perceived
deservingness of the situation was only inﬂuenced by the
manipulation of Deservingness, F(1, 120) = 179.16,
p\.001, gp
2 = .60, and not by the manipulation of Control
Potential nor the interaction of the two manipulations,
F’s\1. Those in the Undeserved conditions found the
situation to be less deserved (M =- 2.15, SD = .90) than
those in the Deserved conditions (M = 1.09, SD = 1.61).
Perceived control was inﬂuenced by the manipulation of
Control Potential, F(1, 120) = 6.23, p = .014, gp
2 = .05.
Those in the Low Control conditions perceived to have less
control (M = .16, SD = 1.90) than those in the High
Control condition (M = .82, SD = 1.80). An unexpected
Table 3 Manipulation checks and types of envy per condition in study 2
Deservingness
Undeserved Deserved
Control potential M (SD) M (SD)
Deservingness Low control -2.23 (.90) 1.12 (1.45)
High control -2.00 (1.27) 1.13 (1.65)
Perceived control Low control -.37 (1.79) .50 (1.98)
High control .03 (1.99) 1.71 (1.32)
Malicious envy Low control 3.93 (1.80) 2.95 (1.76)
High control 4.06 (2.13) 2.29 (1.54)
Benign envy Low control 3.58 (1.54) 4.94 (1.75)
High control 3.53 (3.22) 5.94 (1.33)
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perceived control, F(1, 120) = 15.57, p\.001, gp
2 = .12.
Those in the Undeserved conditions perceived to have less
control (M =- .07, SD = 1.92) than those in the Deserved
conditions (M = 1.15, SD = 1.67). There was no interac-
tion effect of the two manipulations on perceived control,
F(1, 120) = 1.58, p = .211, gp
2 = .01. The unexpected
effect of the Deservingness manipulation on perceived
control seems likely to be caused by the uncertainty of the
situation: if another person can actually receive a beneﬁt
when performing badly, there is also the risk that one is not
rewarded after performing well. In this way, an undeserved
outcome might also indicate a lower perceived control.
Benign and malicious envy
As can be seen in Table 3, the manipulations clearly
affected the type of envy elicited. We performed an anal-
ysis with the two manipulations as independent variables,
and the two types of envy as a within-subjects variable.
First, a main effect for the type of envy existed, F(1,
120) = 27.62, p\.001, gp
2 = .19, indicating that people
reported higher levels of benign envy (M = 5.43,
SD = 1.62) than of malicious envy (M = 2.63,
SD = 1.68). It could be the case that this effect exists
because people do not like to admit being maliciously
envious, neither to themselves nor to others (Foster 1972)
and that the behavior following malicious envy are rather
socially undesirable responses.
For the manipulation of deservingness, an interaction
existed between that manipulation and the intensity of the
envy types, F(1, 120) = 51.97, p\.001, gp
2 = .30. This
interaction conﬁrms that malicious envy was present more
when the situation was undeserved (M = 3.96, SD = 2.06)
than when it was deserved (M = 2.48, SD = 1.70, F(1,
120) = 17.73, p\.001, gp
2 = .13), while benign envy is
experienced more if the situation is perceived to be
deserved (M = 5.37, SD = 1.64) than undeserved
(M = 3.22, SD = 1.76, F(1, 120) = 41.17, p\.001,
gp
2 = .26).
For the manipulation of control potential no main effect
existed, F(1, 120) = 2.68, p = .104, gp
2 = .02. There was a
three-way interaction between the two manipulations and
the envy types, however, F(1, 120) = 4.16, p = . 044,
gp
2 = .03. Closer inspection of the means revealed that this
three-way interaction arose because the manipulation of
Control Potential did not inﬂuence the envy types when the
situation was undeserved, F\1, but it did when the situ-
ation was deserved, F(1, 61) = 8.03, p = .006, gp
2 = .12.
When the situation was deserved, the participants in the
High Control condition experienced more benign envy
(M = 5.94, SD = 1.33) than those in the Low Control
condition (M = 4.94, SD = 1.75, F(1, 61) = 6.48, p =
.013, gp
2 = .10).
To conclude, we found that an upward social compari-
son situation that is deserved elicits benign envy, while one
that is undeserved elicits malicious envy. Appraisals of
control potential were only related to benign envy, and
only in deserved situations. A possible reason for this could
be that the manipulation of deservingness also uninten-
tionally inﬂuenced perceived control: if it was really
undeserved that someone else got a raise, the selection of
who gets a raise seems more random and the perceived
control becomes lower as well. To test the inﬂuence of
perceived deservingness and control potential indepen-
dently, we tested effects of the manipulation checks on
both types of envy. This analysis found that for malicious
envy, only deservingness had an effect, b =- .45,
p\.001, while perceived control had not, b =- .01,
p = .974. For benign envy, however, both deservingness,
b = .43, p\.001, and perceived control, b = .22,
p = .008, had an effect.
The experiences of benign and malicious envy were
negatively correlated, r(124) =- .25, p = .006, such that
the more a person experiences one type of envy, the less
the other type was experienced. This supports that these
two types of envy are not simply both reﬂections of the
same underlying envy emotion, but are qualitatively dif-
ferent. As reported before, the overall intensity of the
emotion reported by participants was similar across all
conditions, suggesting that only the type of envy differed
between conditions. Thus, the general intensity of the
emotion is not inﬂuenced by the perceived deservingness,
which contradicts the predictions that deservingness might
lead to less (Ben-Ze’ev 1990) or more (Miceli and Cas-
telfranchi 2007) envy, rather it is the type of envy that is
inﬂuenced by perceptions of deservingness.
General discussion
The current results conﬁrm our prediction that appraisals of
deservingness and control potential are important in the
shaping of the emotional experiences of benign and mali-
cious envy. These results came from two studies, one using
recalled life-events and assessing appraisal patterns, the
other using an experimental design in which appraisals
were manipulated and emotions were assessed. The results
are important because they provide insight into when
benign envy exists that leads to constructive behavior
aimed at moving up to the superior position, and when
malicious envy exists that leads to destructive behavior
aimed at pulling down the envied person.
The difference in events that elicit malicious envy or
resentment can be found in who is to blame for the
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will be elicited, if the circumstances are to blame than
malicious envy is more likely. This also explains why
earlier work found that resentment gives rise to more
objective feelings of unfairness and malicious envy to
subjective feelings of undeservingness (Smith et al. 1994).
Undeserved situations elicited malicious envy, but it
was not the case that the events that led to benign envy
were strongly deserved. Rather, it seemed that situations
with upward comparisons that reﬂect bad on oneself that
are not perceived to be undeserved lead to benign envy.
Furthermore, although there are likely to be more factors
that could inﬂuence whether benign or malicious envy is
elicited in certain situations, we think that these other
factors will have an inﬂuence via deservingness. For
example, it seems likely that a person more easily becomes
maliciously envious towards a disliked person. We predict
this to be the case because an advantage of a disliked
person could easily be perceived as undeserved.
The ﬁnding that the perception that malicious envy was
not inﬂuenced by the perception of control over the situa-
tion, but that benign envy was is an intriguing one. This
effect is likely to exist because in the undeserved situation
in our Study 2 the perceived control also became lower (if
it is undeserved when people are rewarded, one could also
be not rewarded if one does well, reﬂecting lowered con-
trol). This could reﬂect an issue with our scenario, but we
do wish to note that this confounding of undeservingness
and control potential seems to be present in all undeserved
situations: undeserved situations by deﬁnition constitute of
a discrepancy between what someone put into a situation
and what they got out of it (Feather 1999). Another pos-
sibility, however, is that perhaps the perceived control is a
consequence of experiencing benign envy instead of an
appraisal that led to benign envy. We explicitly asked
participants whether the control potential caused the benign
envy and not the other way around in Study 1 (the benign
envy was caused because I thought that I could do some-
thing about the event’’). However, a possibility exists that
benign envy leads to a motivation to improve one’s own
position and thereby also to a greater perception of control
over the situation (‘‘I want to improve, and I think I can’’).
Given how we assessed control potential this seems unli-
kely, but we cannot fully rule out this interpretation.
Finding the appraisals that distinguish between the two
types of envy also provides insight into who might be more
prone to experiencing each type of envy. People who tend
to feel entitled to many things (Campbell et al. 2004) may
also ﬁnd it undeserved when others have an advantage over
them. These are thus expected to more often and more
intensely experience malicious envy instead of benign
envy. In contrast, people with a high ‘‘belief in a just
world’’ (Rubin and Peplau 1975) feel that people generally
get what they deserve and are therefore expected to expe-
rience benign envy more easily in envy situations. Fur-
thermore, people with an internal locus of control
(Duttweiler 1984) tend to feel that they can easily inﬂuence
situations themselves, and might thus be especially likely
to experience benign envy. Investigating which persons are
likely to become hostile or who become inspired after
being confronted with others who outperform them seems
an interesting line of study.
We also compared how benign and malicious envy
differed from the related emotions admiration and resent-
ment. All these emotions are generally elicited by being
confronted with someone who is better off, but their
experiences and the behavior they lead to are very differ-
ent. We found that benign envy and admiration mainly
differ on whether the comparison reﬂects badly on oneself;
when it does benign envy is elicited if it does not admi-
ration is. For benign envy people felt that the situation had
worsened more than it had for admiration, and the situation
was perceived to have been caused more by oneself. It thus
seems that for benign envy the good performance of
another person is evaluated compared to that of oneself. In
his model of social comparison emotions, Smith (2000)
called this a dual focus for envy (on both oneself and the
other), while the focus of admiration lies only on the other
person.
The current research investigated which appraisals dif-
ferentiate benign and malicious envy. The core ﬁnding that
the deservingness of the situation matters the most, gives us
an important insight into harnessing the potential destruc-
tiveness of envy, and to perhaps even turn it into something
good. Evaluating the positive outcomes of someone else as
deserved prevents possible negative behavior following
envy, and is actually likely to inspire people to work harder
and attain more for oneself.
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